This paper is motivated by the observation that intermediaries play an important role in international trade. The matching role of intermediaries is examined in a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry, where intermediaries develop contacts. Intermediation expands the set of matching technologies available to traders, while convexity in network-building costs with respect to network size gives rise to both direct and indirect trade in equilibrium. The trade pattern depends on the relative responsiveness of the direct and indirect matching technologies to information costs, which for some parameter values generates a non-monotonic relationship between information frictions and trade.
A growing body of empirical literature, using data from a range of countries, has highlighted the importance of intermediaries in international trade. The evidence suggests that the usual assumption made in the theoretical trade literature, namely that a producer trades directly with a final consumer, is a far cry from reality, where trade through wholesalers and retailers constitutes a significant proportion of international transactions. Ahn et al. (2010) Chinese firms who find it difficult to penetrate export markets on their own. This evidence supports the notion that trading costs arise from the cost of buyers and sellers identifying each other; where both parties are small, this is particularly difficult. Moreover, Bernard et al. (2009) find that large, vertically integrated firms engage in both production and intermediation in-house, reinforcing the idea that scale is important for intermediation, whether this is achieved within the firm or by offering intermediation services to a broad range of relatively small firms. This paper presents a model in which the the optimal scale of an intermediary's network of trader contacts, and hence the proportion of intermediated trade, is endogenously determined as a function of information 1 Wholesalers account for 35 per cent and retailers for 6 per cent of Chilean importers. 2 Where 100 per cent of employment is in these sectors.
frictions and technological parameters. Spulber (1996) defines an intermediary as 'an economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers and sellers meet and transact'. There is a broad literature addressing the many functions of middlemen. They have been shown to reduce search costs (Rubinstein and Wolinksy, 1987; Yavas, 1992 Yavas, , 1994 , to offer expertise in markets with adverse selection (Biglaiser, 1993) , to operate as guarantors of quality under producer moral hazard (Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994) , as well as to operate as investors in quality-testing technology (Li, 1998) . More recently, Shevchenko used to motivate empirical analysis. Common to all of these works is the exploration of the role of intermediaries as buyers and sellers of goods, i.e. the first aspect of intermediation identified by Spulber (1996) . Effectively, intermediaries represent an alternative distribution technology, in which the trade-off between fixed costs and marginal costs interacts with firm productivity to determine the mode of distribution selected by firms. Blum et al. (2009a) argue that the fixed fee in their intermediation technology may reflect the cost of establishing an intermediation firm, investing in industry contacts through attendance at trade fairs or buying a database of producer etc, while variable costs depend on the number of firms the intermediary seeks to identify 6 . The literature motivates technological assumptions by appealing to information frictions and match- 5 See Melitz (2003) , Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) , Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis (2009) , among others. 6 Blum et al (2009a) consider costs of matching but do not follow a random matching methodology as used in this paper, and in Rauch and Watson (2004) and Antràs and Costinot (2009) . Rather, they opt for a simpler approach based on Townsend (1983) .
ing costs, yet the precise determinants of direct and indirect costs of exporting remain largely unexplained. This paper focuses on developing theoretical microfoundations for the second aspect of intermediation as defined by Spulber (1996) , namely the matching role of intermediaries through the development of contacts in a trading environment characterised by information frictions. Rauch and Watson (2004) present evidence from a pilot survey of US-based, international trade intermediaries that suggests half of trade intermediation in differentiated products does not involve taking title of goods and reselling (as compared to only 1 per cent for homogeneous-goods). This is consistent with the search based or network view of trade, pioneered by Rauch (2001) , Rauch and Trindade (2002) and others, that posits that the information requirements for differentiated goods are much greater due to the need to match specific characteristics.
There is a general concensus in the literature that information matters for exporting and that information frictions generate costs that can impede trade, particularly for small firms. Although information costs cannot be directly observed in the data, the importance of information for trade has been highlighted repeatedly through surveys and other anecdotal evidence. For example, Roberts and Tybout (2007) report evidence based on interviews of Columbian firms in 1990 that identifies cost of information acquisition as a key component of entry costs into export markets. Firms emphasize the need to identify and make contact with buyers, to get information on foreign prices, market selection, as well as on standards and testing requirements. Many firms reported using both private (for a fee) and public external assistance (brokers, distributors, chambers of commerce etc) to overcome information obstacles. At the same time, many firms reported carrying out their own research in foreign market selection and buyer identification and contact, such that the direct and indirect channels of exporting were used equally.
The need to overcome information barriers is further evidenced by the growing num- Another strand models exporters' distribution problem of identifying and selling to customers as a random matching process (e.g. Antràs and Costinot, 2009 and Rauch and Watson, 2004 ). This paper draws on both the random matching and networks-based trade strands of the literature to examine theoretically how information frictions affect the realisation of trade matches and the pattern of trade through direct and indirect channels. The impact of information costs on both the technology of intermediation and direct matching between importers and exporters is explicitly modeled, thereby informing on the interplay between information costs and direct and indirect exporting.
In doing so, the model fills a gap in the literature on intermediation by exploring the channels through which information costs can affect the pattern of direct and interme- 7 For details on international trade shows by country and industry visit www.fita.org/tshows.html. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the intermediation model and section 2 discusses the key findings and concludes.
The model
This section introduces a pairwise matching model with a continuum of importers and exporters, and a single trade intermediary to capture the incentives for network-building and intermediation where there are barriers to the flow of information.
Model set-up
Consider a two-sided market 8 where importers and exporters match in pairs to exchange a single unit of output. Let there be a continuum of exporters () and a continuum of importers (), each distributed uniformly and with unit density over the interval [0 1].
Suppose that for each trader there is a unique partner on the other side of the market with whom they can trade. Each transaction generates a joint surplus   0, but if agents fail to locate their match they receive a payoff of 0. All market participants are risk-neutral.
The framework best reflects trade in differentiated goods where specific characteristics have to be matched, whether these are features of the product, timing of delivery 8 For a discussion on two-sided markets see Spulber 
Once network investment costs are sunk, it is costless for the intermediary to match trade pairs from within his network of contacts ('indirect trade'). The intermediary's marginal cost of trade intermediation is zero and he is able to match trade pairs from within his network 9 with probability 1. The proportion   also reflects the ex ante probability that any particular exporter   is a network member. Similarly,   is the ex ante probability that any particular importer   is a network member. Thus,     describes the ex ante joint probability that pair (     ) is contacted by the intermediary.
The model focuses on the matching function of trade intermediaries, and hence abstracts from the idea that intermediaries take traded goods onto their books and sell them on. Instead, the intermediary raises revenue by charging a commission for matching trading partners through his network. Let   denote the share of trade surplus, or commission rate, the intermediary demands for successful intermediation of trade.
Timing of the game
The timing of the game between traders and intermediary is as follows:
The intermediary invests in a network of size {     } by contacting a proportion of importers and exporters. Network investment costs,
The intermediary offers contacts a take-it-or-leave-it contract specifying commission rate   for successful matching. Stage 4 -Direct trade: Any unmatched traders trade directly with probability ()
Equilibrium concept
The solution concept used is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and the method employed is backward induction. A strategy for intermediary  is a set
that describes network size and commission rate, given information costs . A strategy for trader  is described by a rule   for accepting or rejecting a contract in stage 2, if such a contract is received. A set of strategies { *
form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game if under these strategies the expected profit of the intermediary and the expected trade surplus of each trader are maximised,
given the strategies of all other players.
Direct and indirect matching
The 
Intermediated trade transactions in stage 3 between network members who accept in stage 2 also generate  per match. The intermediary maximises stage 1 expected profit 10 The particular values of    and    have no bearing on the intermediary's investment decision, or choice of commission rate. Symmetry is assumed for simplicity. subject to participation constraints, thereby ensuring that all traders contacted find it optimal to accept in equilibrium 11 . Let   denote the share of trade surplus captured by , given information costs , where  = {  }. As with direct trade, exporters and importers are assumed to split (residual) surplus equally, so
Traders' expected payoffs from indirect trade, denoted by (Π   ) and (Π   ), respectively, can thus be expressed as:
The measure of intermediated transactions in stage 3 varies depending on the degree of overlap between the two groups of contacts,   and   . Let the measure of intermediated trade matches be denoted by the random variable   . The largest measure of intermediated matches is min {     }, reflecting the maximal overlap between importer and exporter contacts, while the smallest measure of matches is max
where mismatch between the two contact groups is greatest.
For any pair (     ), the ex ante probability of matching through the intermediary is given by     , the joint probability of both partners being contacted in stage 1.
Integrating over the range of possible pairs gives the expected measure of intermediated
It follows directly from the first order conditions of the intermediary's profit maximisation problem that symmetric investment in network-building is optimal, such that   =   ≡  and hence (  ) =  2 . The subgame perfect equilibrium strategy set can thus be redefined as {
11 Since traders are identical in terms of their future trade prospects, they all either accept or reject the take-it-or-leave-it offer in stage 2.
For any exporter (importer) evaluating whether to sign up with the intermediary in stage 2, the probability of her partner also being in the network is  . Each trader can expect to receive (Π  ) with probability  and (Π  ) with probability 1− . Trader expected payoff conditional on being contacted in stage 1, is thus:
To ensure trader participation in stage 2, the intermediary must set   such that expected payoff from signing up to the network, described by (5), is at least as large as the expected payoff from an exclusively direct trade route, given by (2) . The highest commission rate consistent with trader participation is thus:
Hence, traders' optimal acceptance rule  * () in (a)-(c) and
Weighing the expected payoffs with their respective probabilities yields the expected payoff to any trader  at the outset of the game:
Since  *
As all surplus over and above that generated through direct trade is appropriated by the intermediary in equilibrium, traders are indifferent between direct matching and the prospect of intermediated trade.
An important simplifying assumption is that the probability of any pair (     ) matching directly, (), depends only on  and not on the mass of pairs already matched by the intermediary. In other words, there are no congestion externalities in the direct matching technology. Since the probability of matching through the intermediary is a function of network size  , the mass of traders in the intermediary's network is a crucial determinant of intermediated trade in this model 13 , while not so for the direct trade trade technology. This assumption makes starker the distinction between the network-based matching technology of the intermediary and the direct matching technology. In practice, trading firms may actively develop their own networks of business contacts through, for
example, attendance at trade shows, the size of which is likely to be important for the chances of matching directly. This aspect is not considered in the model for the sake of tractability.
Trade and welfare
Since any unmatched network members in stage 3 continue to have the opportunity to trade directly in stage 4, expected trade can never be lower with an active intermediary in the market than without. This is formalised in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 An active intermediary raises expected trade volume unambiguously compared to when only direct trade is possible. 
Expected trade volume with an intermediary is thus at least as large as when only direct trade is possible and unambiguously higher when the intermediary is active (  0).
Since traders are as well off (in expected terms) under the intermediation contract as through direct trade, the intermediary's expected profit represents a pure welfare gain.
The gain arises from the fact that the intermediary expands the set of possible production technologies for matching, while exclusive appropriation of these welfare gains stems from being a monopolist provider of the indirect matching technology. Lemma 2 formalises this discussion 14 .
Lemma 2 An active intermediary raises expected welfare unambiguously compared to when only direct trade is possible.
14 Note the results in this section are general in that they do not depend on the functional forms of (  ) and ().
Proof. Let ( ) denote expected welfare with an intermediary in the market and (  ) denote expected welfare when only direct matching is possible. The total surplus generated from direct and indirect trade is  2  and () (1 −  2 ) , respectively, giving:
Equilibrium expected welfare with an intermediary is thus at least as large as expected welfare when only direct trade is possible and unambiguously greater where  *  0.
These results emphasize that, through matching, intermediaries have a key role as trade facilitators.
Equilibrium network size
To characterise the intermediary's optimal choice of networks size some further restrictions are placed on the marginal cost of network expansion:
As described in (11), (  ) is monotonically increasing in , for any given network size  , and monotonically increasing in  , for given . Convexity of marginal cost in network size  (but not ) is necessary for an interior equilibrium  * ∈ (0 1) to exist for some range of ; otherwise, only corner solutions exist 15 . This assumption implies the intermediary's search process generates contacts that are increasingly inaccessible, so that it increasingly costly to widen the range of contacts. This is arguably a realistic assumption in that when building a network of contacts one can imagine some are easier to make than others and that when expanding a network those that can be made at lower cost are established first 16 .
The intermediary chooses  ∈ [0 1] to maximise expected profits, (Π  ), subject to
and  *  , where:
For concreteness and to solve for  * analytically let (  ) take the following form: 15 Under alternative cost specifications, where marginal cost of network expansion is independent of network size e.g.  (), where  0 ()  0 and  (0) = 0, it can be shown that there exist only corner solutions to the intermediary's profit maximisation problem, with contacts developed with all traders, or none. 16 There is evidence that both direct and indirect trade channels are observed amongst exporting firms e.g. see Roberts and Tybout (2007) .
Parameter  is the elasticity of marginal cost  (  ) with respect to information costs ,  is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to network size  and  is a shift factor. Total network investment cost  ( ) =  + 2   +1 is thus convex in  .
Further, let () be described by:
It follows that  *  () =   , where  denotes the elasticity of the equilibrium commission rate with respect to information cost . Substituting (13) and (14) into (12) yields the following expression for expected profits:
Maximising ( Proof. For proof see Appendix B.
Condition ( +1)  2 implies that as information costs increase, the direct matching route worsens relatively more than the cost of network provision. The intermediary can thus enjoy higher expected profits by relaxing the constraint on the commission fee the intermediary can demand.
There are four distinct equilibrium patterns of network investment. The parameter space is split into four ranges, denoted by (A)-(D), each corresponding to a different set of incentives for network investment:
When the elasticity of the intermediary's optimal commission rate with respect to information costs, , exceeds the elasticity of the marginal cost of network expansion with respect to information costs, , then optimal network size is increasing with . As information costs rise, the increase in the commission rate the intermediary can command exceeds the increase in networking cost (  ) making a network expansion profitable.
(B)  =  ≥ 1: When the elasticities are exactly equal, then the effects of changing information cost  on the intermediary's cost and expected revenue exactly offset each other, so optimal network size is unchanging 18 with .
   : When the elasticity of marginal networking cost exceeds the elasticity of the commission rate with respect to , then it is optimal for the intermediary to reduce network size as information costs rise. Since ( + 1)  2, then from lemma 3 (  ) is sufficiently elastic with respect to  so as to offset the effects of information cost , raising equilibrium profit overall.
 : When the commission rate is less responsive to  than is (  ), then it is optimal for the intermediary to reduce network size as information costs 18 Note that while the intermediary's investment decision is unaffected at the margin, it follows from Lemma (3) that unconstrained profits are increasing with . 
It follows from the interior equilibrium that 
It is straightforward to show that Recall that (  ) is the expected welfare that would prevail if there were no intermediary in the market. It follows from (10) that ( * ) − (  ) = (Π * ) is a measure of the intermediary's contribution to social welfare. Moreover, since    ≥ 1, it follows from lemma 3 that (Π *  ) is increasing in  in the interior equilibrium, so the contribution of intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing in the level of information costs where the intermediary is active.
Intuitively, if the probability of direct matching is more responsive to information costs than is the cost of network expansion, then indirect trade offers a relatively more attractive matching technology than direct trade when information costs are higher.
Hence, the proportion of indirect trade to total trade is increasing in the level of information frictions, even though the relationship between total trade and information costs is non-monotonic. Figures (2) - (4) Figure (4) shows that intermediation is welfare improving and that it is more so when information cost is higher.
Numerical simulation

Equilibrium pattern of intermediation and trade (B)
Proposition 2 Proof. See Appendix E.
In this case, the optimal network size is decreasing in  and cost parameters, but increasing in . The decline in network. size with higher  implies there are fewer intermediated matches and hence a larger measure of traders seeking a direct match in stage 4 (though higher  implies a lower probability of successful direct matching).
, it follows from lemma 3 that (Π *  ) is increasing in information cost  in the interior equilibrium. Hence, the contribution of intermediation to social welfare is once again both positive and increasing in the level of information costs, where the intermediary is active.  it follows from Lemma (3) that expected profit and thus the contribution of intermediation to social welfare is decreasing in the level of information costs .
Equilibrium pattern of intermediation and trade (D)
Intuitively, in both cases (C) and (D) networking costs are more responsive to information costs than the probability of a direct match, so direct trade offers a relatively more attractive matching technology than indirect trade as information costs rise. Hence, indirect trade is decreasing relative to direct trade in the level of information frictions. Figure (7) illustrates 21 the pattern of network investment
Numerical simulation
. For this range of elasticities, the commission rate is less responsive to information cost  than is networking cost (  ), giving rise to a negative relationship between network size and information costs along the interior path. Moreover, as illustrated in figure (8) , unconstrained expected profit, denoted by (Π   ) rises without limit as  → 0, which implies that in the absence of a binding market size constraint, the intermediary finds it profitable to invest in an an ever-increasing network size as information 
Conclusion
This paper presents a stylised pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry between trade partners, where a single intermediary 22 has the opportunity to invest in a network of contacts and facilitate trade matching for a success fee. The framework innovates by explicitly examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade intermediation, thereby endogenising the pattern of direct and indirect trade.
The framework delivers four key results. First, intermediation unambiguously raises 21 Illustrated for parameter values  = 6,  = 3,  = 2,  = 1,  = 01, and  = 2. 22 A parallel paper extends the model to explore the strategic interaction between two intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size. The key results and patterns of this paper are robust to this extension. The model shows that network competition between information intermediaries has a distinctive market structure, where intermediaries are monopolist service providers to some contacts but duopolists over contacts they share in their network overlap. expected trade volume and social welfare by expanding the set of matching technologies available to traders. Second, convexity of network-building costs with respect to network size is necessary for an equilibrium characterised by both direct and indirect trade to exist. Third, assuming convexity, optimal network size and hence the equilibrium pattern of trade is shown to depend on the level of information costs as well as the relative responsiveness of direct and indirect matching technologies with information costs. In particular, if the probability of direct matching is at least as responsive to information costs than is the cost of network expansion, then indirect trade offers a relatively more attractive matching technology than direct trade when information costs are higher.
Hence, the proportion of indirect trade to total trade is increasing in the level of information frictions. Conversely, if networking costs are more responsive to information costs than the probability of a direct match, then direct trade offers a relatively more attractive matching technology than indirect trade when information costs are higher. The model can be extended to multiple intermediaries; this is considered in a companion paper, which confirms the findings of this paper but adds insights on the strategic interaction between competing intermediaries. One potential avenue for further development is to introduce risk aversion in small firms and model intermediation as the provision of insurance against matching risk. Moreover, there is scope for empirical application of the model to examine the composition of bilateral trade, between direct and intermediated, for country pairs with varying degrees of information asymmetry, as proxied by common language, average cultural and political distance, indices of bureaucratic burden etc. As such, the model can pave the way for future research.
Appendix A. Derivation of e 
Maximising (12) with respect to  gives:
Solving yields the interior profit-maximising network size, e  , where:
The second order condition is:
20 is negative provided e   h  − (+1) i 1 −1 . Since   1 this condition is satisfied, so e  corresponds to a maximum.
Appendix B. Proof of lemma 3
Partially differentiating (16) with respect to  yields:
It follows that expected profits are increasing with , if:
Substituting   (  ),  0 () and e  and rearranging gives the necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium intermediary profits, (Π *  ), to be increasing in  where there is an interior solution for network size:
Appendix C. Proof of proposition 1
The intermediary sets  = min
Hence
but network size is constrained by market size. Let b b  denote the threshold level of information costs at which e  = 1. Solving e  = 1 for  yields:
Hence, equilibrium network size is
, where (Π  ) ≥ 0 and e  ≤ 1, network size follows the interior
These results are summarised by:
* into equation 8 yields the equilibrium expected (total) trade path over this range of information costs:
Finally, the piece-wise function ( * ) follows directly from substitution of  * into equation 10:
.
It follows from the interior equilibrium that:
Moreover, ( * ) can be decomposed into direct and indirect equilibrium trade. Let direct 23 and intermediated trade in equilibrium be denoted by, ( *  ),and ( *  ), respectively, where:
Let the equilibrium direct and indirect trade shares be denoted by   and   , respectively, where:
It is straightforward to show that 
Appendix D. Proof of proposition 2
If  =  ≥ 1 and  ≤ ( + 1), then equilibrium network size,  * , expected trade volume,  * ( ), and expected welfare,  * ( ), are described by:
If  =  ≥ 1 and   ( + 1), then the unit measure of market size poses a binding
As the equilibrium network size is constant it follows that the measure of intermediated trade is also constant. In the interior equilibrum: 
Appendix E. Proof of proposition 3
The equilibrium path if 
The piece-wise functions ( * ) and ( * ) follow directly from  * and equations (8) and (10), respectively: 
Hence, optimal network size is decreasing in  and cost parameters, but increasing in . The piece-wise functions ( * ) and ( * ) follow directly from  * and equations (8) and (10), respectively.  0.
The trade effects follow. Expected profit is unconstrained in the interior equilibrium.
Since  ≤
+1
 then it follows from Lemma (3) that expected profit and thus the contribution of intermediation to social welfare is decreasing in the level of information costs . 
